

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

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**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH MEETING**

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 9 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI (Italy)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA  
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE  
Mr. C. H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE  
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE  
Mr. M. B. BRIMAH

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland: Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. B. KAJDY  
Mrs. M. COSMA-KOMPANIEJCEW

Romania: Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden: Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I. I. CHEPROV  
Mr. V. B. TOULINOV  
Mr. A. A. OZADOVSKY

United Arab Republic: Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom: Lord CHALFONT  
Sir Harold BEELEY  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. P. W. J. BUXTON

United States of America: Mr. A. S. FISHER  
Mr. L. WEILER  
Mr. C. G. BREAM  
Mr. A. NEIDLE

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the 280th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At our meeting held on 5 July my delegation suggested a way of moving ahead with the drafting of a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/PV.270, p.19). That proposal appears to have been rejected by the representative of the Soviet Union and by several representatives of other Warsaw Pact nations. I shall have something more to say about that towards the end of my remarks today. In our statement of 5 July we also suggested that the techniques we advocated could perhaps be applied to other issues before us, such as reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests; and the main part of what I have to say today will be devoted to following up that idea.

In the preamble to the Moscow Treaty, signed three years ago, it was stated that the signatories were "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1). However, three years of negotiations have brought us no closer to agreement on banning underground tests. We are still deadlocked over how to verify that obligations to put an end to all tests are being fulfilled.

Today it is more urgent than ever to close that loop-hole. Many representatives here have stressed that a comprehensive ban on tests would be an effective means of inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons through manufacture of such weapons by a non-nuclear State unassisted. By reaching an agreement to cease all underground tests, the major nuclear Powers would also reaffirm their readiness to work together to ensure peace and security in the world. Furthermore, it would greatly aid in halting the "qualitative" arms race, as mentioned by the representative of the United States on 2 August (ENDC/PV.278, p.6).

We put it to the Committee whether the time has not come for us to try to work out language for a treaty to prohibit underground tests, building on the measure of agreement which already exists and on certain suggestions made by non-aligned nations in this Committee. It is not the Canadian delegation's intention, of course, to try to draft a treaty. However, we hope it will be useful if we suggest certain points which such a document might cover. Before doing so, however, I should like to comment briefly on statements in regard to the cessation of nuclear testing made during the past several weeks.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The basic purpose was clearly and concisely stated a little over a week ago by the representative of Burma, U Maung Maung, as follows:

" 'Like every other delegation present here, the Burmese delegation wishes to see an end to all nuclear testing in all environments ... Our objective is -- and until we reach it will always remain -- a comprehensive treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and underground in conditions which will give every party to the treaty reasonable assurance that the ban is being observed by all other parties, for without such assurance the treaty will always be in jeopardy.' " (ENDC/PV.277, p.11).

Canada fully supports that statement. In particular, we agree that conditions must be created "which will give every party to the treaty reasonable assurance that the ban is being observed by all other parties, for without such assurance the treaty will always be in jeopardy".

I should like to stress "reasonable assurance". Some people seem to think -- and I am not referring to any delegation here -- that the stopping of underground testing is so urgent and so important that a treaty should be signed forthwith, whether or not we can agree on suitable verification clauses. We think such a view is shortsighted, because an unverified treaty would be most fragile and would probably break down; and if that happened it would be a serious setback to peace and disarmament. On the other hand, to insist on verification procedures which would be more extensive and intrusive than are needed to produce a high probability that no breach of the treaty would go undetected would be equally short-sighted.

It is worth emphasizing that no delegation here has suggested that a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of testing would not be in its own nation's interest as well as in the interest of the whole world.

In his useful statement at our meeting of 26 July the representative of Brazil quoted excerpts from recent statements by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, setting out their differences on verification (ENDC/PV.276, p.17). The Soviet Union has reiterated its view that national means of detection are adequate to ensure respect for the prohibition of all underground nuclear tests. United States representatives have referred on numerous occasions to the extensive work being done by their country in order to develop the scientific means for identification of underground seismic events. They have made it perfectly clear that, with all the vast amount of research that has been done to date, it is not possible to conclude that national systems would be sufficient to detect all underground tests.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The scientific advice available to the Canadian Government supports that conclusion. There are some indications that further research may not assist us very much in resolving this issue. In other words, if anyone hopes that further technical efforts by Western nations will necessarily bring about a change in their attitude to the question of verification, he may be too optimistic. A decision may have to be taken on the basis of the scientific knowledge at present available -- that is, a decision on the means of verification to be adopted -- if there is to be a treaty.

At our meeting of 7 July the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, stated in some detail his Government's position on the question of inspections. The passage in that statement beginning "We do not ask for inspection for the sake of inspection" (ENDC/PV.271, p.26) was quoted by Lord Chalfont at our 279th meeting. For our part, we should like once again to call attention to that statement. Later Mr. Foster noted that national means of identification had been improved, and stated: "We have not sought inspections for seismic events which could be identified by such systems" (ibid., p.28). Mr. Foster went on to discuss the efforts the United States had made to find inspection procedures which would indeed be the minimum required to monitor an underground test ban and give the world confidence that it was being observed by all parties.

After listening to all that has been said on this subject by both sides, the Canadian delegation has difficulty in understanding the reasons for the attitude of the Soviet Union. It has refused to discuss the suggestions of the United States for providing a minimum assurance that the treaty is being adhered to; it continues to state that national means are sufficient, and it declines to consider any sort of scientific or technical talks -- formal or informal -- which might help to find a way out of the impasse. We find it hard to reconcile that position with the stated desire of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement banning underground tests.

In this situation, several delegations have tried to find means to promote a further partial test ban. Some of these have included the concept of a threshold of a certain seismic magnitude, above which all tests would be prohibited, and the use of national identification systems for verification. The delegation of the United Arab Republic has further developed that idea to include a moratorium on tests below the threshold, and has also suggested the possibility of associating "the application of the moratorium ... with the concept of 'verification by challenge'..." (ENDC/PV.259, p.30).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The "threshold" idea has a considerable history in test-ban negotiations, as representatives will be aware. It was put forward in 1960 by the United States as part of a comprehensive plan to ban all underground tests which also included provision for on-site inspection. It is noteworthy that more recent official proposals regarding a threshold have not included inspection procedures, except for the proposal by the United Arab Republic to which I have just referred. I would also remark here that the Canadian scientific advisers tell us there are many complexities and difficulties in determining how the "threshold" principle could be applied in limiting underground nuclear testing.

My delegation thinks that "moratorium" is an ill-omened word after the events of 1961; and we should like to suggest that it should not be used in any proposals for halting nuclear tests. While we are talking about language, we recall that Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, suggested at our meeting on 4 August that perhaps "challenge" was not a very good word to apply to the procedure which had been suggested by her delegation for a step-by-step verification that ambiguous underground events were not nuclear explosions (ENDC/PV.279, p.9). Lord Chalfont suggested at the same meeting that "verification by consent" might be a better phrasing (ibid., p.15). The Canadian delegation wonders whether "inquiry and response" might be a suitable description. In any case my delegation believes that there is much merit in the proposal, whatever it is called, as we made clear when we outlined our views on the relationship of that idea to all aspects of the verification question at the meeting on 12 July (ENDC/PV.272, p.7).

Mrs. Myrdal said at our meeting on 4 August: "The idea no doubt needs further elaboration and, not least, examination in relation to varying formulations of a treaty or to different situations" (ENDC/PV.279, p.10). Lord Chalfont, at the same meeting, made valuable suggestions concerning how the contemplated procedure might work out (ibid., pp. 13 et seq.).

We were very glad to hear the representative of the United States say, in his helpful statement at the same meeting:

"What is to be explored is whether the concept of a trial period of verification by invitation or challenge might be a useful component of an agreement to suspend all testing. During this trial period, presumably, procedures would be tested to determine if they would be satisfactory for a test-ban treaty of indefinite duration" (Ibid., p.32).

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation hopes that the results of that exploration will help to solve the basic problem that faces us and that other States will also be prepared to explore that idea in the same spirit.

At the same meeting Mrs. Myrdal made a point with which we are very much in agreement, as follows:

"... a treaty banning all tests, and preferably a treaty applying to all nations, would have the maximum effect in fostering the trust and confidence so sorely needed among nations. Also, a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear testing, signed and ratified by a great number of States, would serve as that bulwark against proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries which we are so urgently seeking in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament."

(ibid., p.10).

Mrs. Myrdal went on to suggest that, owing to well-known difficulties, we might have to be satisfied at this session if the nuclear Powers would agree to start active detailed negotiations on such a treaty in the near future -- in the very near future. She also suggested that the scientific and legal advisers should be set to work immediately on treaty details.

The Canadian delegation, as we mentioned in our last statement on this subject, has been thinking over the numerous suggestions made here for securing agreement to stop underground testing; and we should now like to offer some views on the points which such a treaty might contain.

We believe that the agreement to prohibit underground nuclear testing should be a separate treaty from the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), as was suggested by the Swedish delegation (ENDC/PV.256, p.9). The reason is that the verification problem in a treaty on underground testing is more difficult than that in the treaty for the other three environments; therefore, there is greater danger that failure of verification might cause its breakdown. Such a breakdown should not entail a breakdown of the Moscow Treaty.

It seems that general agreement already exists on what should constitute the core provisions of an underground test cessation treaty. Under the first article parties might undertake both to prohibit and to prevent the carrying out of any underground nuclear explosions at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Furthermore, the parties should undertake to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any underground nuclear explosion anywhere. We do not think that any delegation here will disagree that that is the principle which we are

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

seeking to enshrine in treaty language. The Soviet Union has repeatedly taken the view that agreement in principle is required before detailed negotiations begin. Here we seem to have agreement in principle; and to the Canadian delegation there would seem to be no reason why common language on that -- perhaps the most important part of an underground test cessation treaty -- could not be agreed upon without delay.

Of course, that part of the treaty would have to be supplemented by other provisions. In our view, articles II and III of the partial Treaty of 1963 could be adopted with little change. Article II deals with the amendment of the Treaty, including provision for the convening of a conference; while article III covers signature, ratification, accession, entry into force and registration. I admit, to forestall criticism by the Soviet Union and others, that those are "nuts and bolts" provisions.

A number of representatives have stressed the importance which would be attached to a withdrawal clause in an underground test cessation treaty. The Canadian delegation fully agrees with that. Accordingly, it would probably not be sufficient simply to incorporate into the treaty a provision similar to that in article IV of the partial test-ban Treaty. Representatives will recall that that article states:

"This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

"Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance." (ENDC/100/Rev.1, p.3).

In our view, the first sentence of that article should go into the draft, as we are convinced that the treaty should in principle be of unlimited duration. However, while we hope for "unlimited duration", we know that the right of withdrawal from a treaty when other parties fail to observe its provisions is an established principle of international law. So we must examine what conditions should be set for withdrawal from this particular treaty.

In the first place, consider the phrase "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized ..." and so on. The Canadian delegation would interpret that freely as meaning that, if there were grave suspicions that any party was conducting underground tests and no conclusive evidence to the contrary were forthcoming, then the right of withdrawal would exist. Hence we feel that, in the proposed

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treaty, arrangements should be provided for dealing with an unclear or suspicious underground event in the territory of any party to the treaty.

For example, it might be agreed that any party to the treaty would have the right to approach another party regarding an event related to the subject matter of the treaty -- that is, an underground test or a suspected underground test -- should circumstances require. It might be advisable also to provide that the State making the inquiry should be required to state the reasons for doing so -- seismological evidence and so forth. The State to which the inquiry was directed should be under obligation to provide information to make it clear that the event was not a nuclear explosion. If the State formulating the inquiry felt that the response was not satisfactory in the light of all the information it had, there should be one or more courses open to it.

At this point we should mention that the "club" for the pooling of seismological information, suggested by Sweden, if it is organized, should be able to contribute in an effective way to the dissipation of doubts and suspicions about underground events. As the members of the organization became more expert in the subject of detection and identification of underground tests, their conclusions about the necessity or otherwise of on-site inspections would be of increasing value. It has of course -- I emphasize -- always been understood, under the Swedish proposals, that conclusions would be reached on a national basis, not by an international organization.

What could be the further recourse of a State whose inquiry was not satisfactorily answered? There could be a provision in the treaty for the depositary States to convene a conference to which all parties primarily concerned would be invited; or the treaty could provide for the matter to be taken before the Security Council, if there were any question of withdrawal from the treaty. The conference or the Council, taking into account evidence from all quarters, should examine the facts and assess the significance of the situation.

At any time during the proceedings, after the first inquiry had been made, the treaty could provide for a State which was being asked about an event to invite representatives of the inquiring State and others to visit the site of the ambiguous event. The invitation to visit the site would, in our view, provide prima facie evidence of the wholehearted adherence to the purposes of the treaty. As I have mentioned earlier, such a visit would in certain cases, we are advised by our scientists, provide the only certain proof that no nuclear explosion had occurred. It seems to us in this connexion that it might be desirable to specify a maximum number of inspections by invitation per annum which parties to the treaty would be expected to offer.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

There would have to be agreement on how such inspections should be carried out. The representative of Mexico has proposed that it should be done by experts drawn from a panel of scientists of non-aligned countries (ENDC/PV.246, p.9; ENDC/PV.269, p.27). The representative of the United States, in commenting on that and other suggestions at our meeting of 7 July, recalled the United States/United Kingdom memorandum of 1 April 1963 (ENDC/78), which had envisaged a role for international inspectors in the verification process. He added: "if adversary, or reciprocal, inspection forms the main element, a nuclear side requesting an inspection may be more willing to accept simplified procedures" (ENDC/PV.271, p.31). Finally, we understand that, for an inspection to be conclusive, the time at which it takes place is very important: it should be neither too soon nor too late.

The final part of the withdrawal clause could be based on the present Article IV of the partial test cessation Treaty, which I quoted earlier. We believe, however, that there should be a proviso that the Security Council, as well as parties to the treaty, should be notified by a State that is contemplating withdrawal.

The Canadian delegation, in putting those preliminary ideas forward, wishes to make clear that we are taking no firm position on the best method for achieving our purpose. We have intended only to discuss various ideas, most of them already mentioned in the Conference, to stimulate further thought; and we should appreciate hearing the views of other delegations on those points, especially the views of the delegation of the Soviet Union.

Before concluding, I should like to comment briefly on recent statements by representatives of eastern European countries about the suggestion the Canadian delegation and others have made that we should make better progress towards achieving agreement on a non-proliferation treaty if we were to identify and convert into treaty language those aspects of the two draft non-proliferation treaties on which there is substantial agreement. The representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria all chose to dismiss that proposal as a scheme to delude world public opinion and give a false impression of progress. The representative of Bulgaria went so far as to describe it as "tantamount to a deception of the peoples" (ENDC/PV.276, p.9). It would seem that the Canadian delegation must have a higher respect than the eastern European delegations for the soundness of world opinion. I do not believe that we here should be able to delude world opinion even if we wished to do so --which of course we do not.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

We quite agree with the representative of the Soviet Union when he says, as he recently did, that our task here is to overcome the differences which separate us on non-proliferation. The question is how that can best be done. The view of the Warsaw Treaty representatives seems to be that we must focus our attention exclusively on one-half of the central formula of the two drafts here, where we are perfectly aware that there is a major difference still existing. In fact most of our time has been spent on the exercise of hammering at the difference.

But should both sides just go on repeating their positions until it is time to go to the United Nations General Assembly? In our view there is nothing to be gained by further repetitious statements on this important but as yet unsolved difference about how the treaty is to be worded to prevent nuclear weapons from being disseminated -- that is, being passed from the possession and control of a nuclear Power to the possession and control of a nation not now possessing nuclear weapons. The Canadian delegation hopes that that problem will be solved, and before very long; but we do not think it will be solved any sooner by repetition here of positions expounded many times over. If we go on in the same way for the remainder of the meetings that we shall be devoting to non-proliferation, we shall be exactly in the same spot.

It was in the light of this unsatisfactory situation that the Canadian suggestion for an alternative approach was made. Our idea was simply that in the process of identifying and setting down in treaty language those aspects of the two drafts on which agreement already exists we should be able to reduce and pinpoint the areas of difference. As has already been pointed out here, that is the well-established practice in the negotiation of treaties. In our view it could have helped to set the stage for the reconciliation of differences which must eventually come.

In concluding my remarks on this matter, I should like to say that the Canadian delegation believes that if the Committee had acted on the proposal which we and others put forward, far from deluding the public it would place before it in clear form the exact state of the negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty. We hoped that, if the co-operation of those most directly concerned could be achieved, it might help to break our current deadlock. We regret that one co-Chairman should be unwilling to give our idea a try. We hope that the Soviet Union and its allies will reconsider their position in this matter and that the suggestions we have made today will not be brushed aside in summary fashion.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with care to the thoughtful remarks of the representative of Canada and I shall study them; they seem to be interesting, provocative and positive in their scope and motion.

I should like to speak today on one inescapable technological fact and the implications of this fact on our efforts to obtain a non-proliferation treaty. This inescapable fact is that a nuclear explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for such use. Moreover, the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons.

This inescapable technological fact presents those of us around this table, and the States that we represent, with a serious dilemma. This dilemma stems from the fact that all of us here, I am sure, believe that any possible future beneficial uses of peaceful nuclear explosive devices should be available to all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. On the other hand, all of us here must also recognize the conclusion which inexorably follows from the technological fact, the inescapable technological fact, which I stated at the outset of my remarks. That conclusion is, of course, that any non-proliferation treaty would be ineffective indeed if it permitted the development by non-nuclear weapon States of the nuclear explosive devices which are necessary for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The United States has had that dilemma under consideration for some time. I wish to speak about it today because I am now in a position to propose, on behalf of the United States, a solution of the dilemma -- a solution under which the extension of the possible future benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to all States would be helped, not hampered. I am speaking on this issue on a day scheduled for discussion of collateral measures other than non-proliferation because I believe that all members of the Committee should have in mind that dilemma, and our proposed solution for it before we recess for the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

In considering the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions and a non-proliferation treaty, I should make it clear that our primary concern is not that a non-nuclear-weapon State might somehow cheat and develop a nuclear-weapon capability under the guise of developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. In the context of a non-proliferation agreement, this kind of cheating is not the real problem. A State, no matter how pure its motives, could not possibly develop the capability of detonating nuclear devices for peaceful purposes without, by so doing, acquiring the capability of

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

detonating nuclear bombs. Thus, the development of nuclear explosives for any purpose by a State which does not now possess nuclear weapons would inevitably involve the acquisition by that State of a nuclear weapons capability.

I should like to explore somewhat further the dilemma with which we are faced, by viewing it in the perspective which the United States has gained by virtue of its own experience in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions. For many years the United States has been carrying out extensive studies to develop peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. However, we still have several difficult technical problems to solve before we shall be able to demonstrate applications which are both technically sound and economically feasible.

The difficulties with which non-nuclear-weapon Powers would be faced in developing useful nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be infinitely greater. They may be illustrated by the fact that the projects which appear to be of the greatest interest -- nuclear earth-moving projects, such as digging canals or building dams -- can be feasible only if highly-sophisticated thermonuclear devices are used. Fission-type explosives are not practical for excavation, both because the radioactivity release would be unacceptably high, and because fissionable material is too costly a source of energy to make such a project economically feasible.

The United States' experience with developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes both sharpens the dilemma with which we are faced and points to its resolution. This experience has made it quite clear that the development by a State not possessing nuclear weapons or peaceful nuclear explosives, and in particular, nuclear devices for excavations, could not be justified as a matter of economics, in view of the fact that such development is extremely costly in terms of scientific manpower, materials consumed and the capital investment required.

It seems to us, therefore, that the development of nuclear explosives for peaceful applications by a State not already possessing nuclear weapons could hardly be accepted by the world as involving peaceful purposes only. Such a development would not be consistent with the purposes of a treaty designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore the restrictions of any non-proliferation treaty which is negotiated should be applicable equally to nuclear weapons and to nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Nevertheless, the United States believes, as I have indicated earlier, that the possible future benefits from the use of peaceful nuclear explosives should be made available to all States, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons. But the United States also believes that these possible future benefits should be made available only in a manner which would not contribute in any way to the grave dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation. Accordingly the United States believes that, if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives that are permissible under test-ban treaty limitations prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear-weapon States should make available to other States nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications. Such a service would consist of performing the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation, with the nuclear device remaining in the custody and under the control of the State which performs the service.

This would make available any possible future benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States at a cost far below that at which they could develop and produce such devices for themselves. It would eliminate the desire for such benefits as a reason for taking action which would involve the spreading of nuclear-weapon capabilities.

As I conclude my remarks, I would request the representatives in this Committee to think for a moment of the implications of what I have said with respect to what the United States has learnt in its own programme of developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. As I indicated, the United States has been carrying out extensive studies to develop peaceful applications of nuclear explosives; but we still have several difficult technical problems to solve before we shall be able to demonstrate applications which are both technically and economically feasible. I have also stated that only highly-sophisticated thermonuclear devices are feasible for nuclear excavation projects.

The implications for non-proliferation involved in these facts are clear. If we do not face them squarely in a non-proliferation treaty, it would mean that a non-nuclear-weapon State, though undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons, would be entitled to embark upon a nuclear programme to develop highly-sophisticated thermo-nuclear devices available for use as weapons. Could this possibly be called the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Some of you may doubtless wonder why I have chosen to make these remarks today. They might ask: do we not already have enough problems in the way of negotiating a non-proliferation treaty without raising the troublesome problems involved in nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes? The answer is that the inescapable technological facts which I have described today exist. These inescapable technological facts have unavoidable implications. We cannot responsibly ignore either these facts or their implications in seeking an effective non-proliferation treaty, one which will last.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened today to the statements made by the representatives of Canada and the United States. We shall study these statements and, if necessary, in due course state our views on the ideas which have been put forward by the representatives of Canada and the United States.

Permit me now, Mr. Chairman, to put forward the considerations which the delegation of the Soviet Union would like to expound on the subject of other collateral measures, in accordance with what has been agreed in the Committee concerning the procedure of our work (ENDC/PV.272, p.36). Today, apparently, is the last day at our disposal for expressing our views on various other collateral measures. In this connexion we should like to make a review of what we have been considering here and to see where we stand as a result of the examination of these measures. Having said that, we should like to proceed at once to explain our position on the questions which the Committee is considering.

A few days ago we marked the third anniversary of the signing in Moscow of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1). That Treaty was an important landmark in the struggle for disarmament, a struggle which affects the vital interests of all peoples. At present 116 States have already assumed the obligations laid down by the Moscow Treaty concerning a partial prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Besides the Moscow Treaty, other steps which, though limited in their scope, are nevertheless very important have been taken towards limiting the arms race, such as the agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117), certain reductions for a limited period in military budgets (ENDC/PV.157, pp.10,13,14), and the curtailment of production of fissile materials for military purposes (ENDC/131, 132).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Naturally, everyone cherished the hope that agreement would soon be reached on many other disarmament problems and, in the first place, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ending of all test explosions of such weapons. During the last three years the question of extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty to cover all nuclear explosions has been considered on several occasions in our Committee. Considerable attention has been devoted to this problem at our recent meetings. All the speakers in the Committee agreed, apparently, that it was necessary to prohibit underground nuclear weapon tests and to make the Moscow Treaty universal and complete. At the same time many speakers here noted with deep concern that no progress had so far been achieved in this important question, that the Committee was losing time, and with it even the hope of a positive solution to this question.

Of course, it is undeniable that the present situation is extremely unfavourable for the accomplishment of positive measures in the field of disarmament. The incipient process of slowing down the arms race was interrupted by the United States, which started open military aggression in Viet-Nam. However, even now it would be possible to reach agreement on the accomplishment of a number of important collateral measures, including the prohibition of all nuclear tests. It would be possible to reach agreement if all the participants in the negotiations were to manifest a definite desire to do so, goodwill and the necessary minimum of confidence.

We note that on the part of the Western Powers and, above all, on the part of the United States there is no lack of assurances regarding their willingness to prohibit underground nuclear weapon tests. It would seem that on this question it would have been possible to record a unanimity of views. However, no sooner do we start talking about the concrete conditions of such a prohibition than the United States delegation, supported by the representatives of the other Western Powers, puts forward its old demand for the inspection of underground tests.

When the question of concluding the Moscow Treaty was under discussion, the United States also put forward a demand for inspection. It should be clear to the participants in the present session of the negotiations that this demand of the United States neither had then nor has now any scientific or practical basis, and that it was put forward then and is being put forward now exclusively for political reasons. In making its demand for international inspection on the territory of other States a condition for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, the United States wishes to subordinate the solution of this important international problem to its own political aims, which

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have nothing to do with the problem of prohibiting underground nuclear tests. Apparently it is more important to the United States to impose its own conditions for the solution of the problem of prohibiting underground tests than to achieve the solution of this problem itself.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly explained that international inspections could be used to gather military information of interest to a potential aggressor. Whatever may be the method of carrying out such inspections, and whatever precautions may be taken, it cannot be denied that an obligation in regard to the carrying out of inspections would enable various kinds of "inspection" teams to obtain access to the territory of a State without any necessity. States and peoples, especially those which more than once within the lifetime of one generation have borne the heavy consequences of foreign aggression, cannot and must not show unconcern and complacency in questions of their security. They will certainly not assume an obligation to open their territories to inspection, for which there is no necessity. We are convinced, just as we were during the negotiations for the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, that for control over the observance of a ban on all nuclear weapon tests, including those underground, national means of detection are fully adequate. We have spoken about that on many occasions and we now deem it necessary to stress that fact once again.

The real reason for the position of the United States on the problem of ending underground nuclear weapon tests lies in the fact that a positive solution of this problem apparently does not suit it, because the prohibition of such tests would be a substantial obstacle to the further improvement of nuclear weapons. Underground nuclear explosions are being carried out very intensively at the subterranean testing grounds in Nevada. Nuclear tests are going on one after another, and since the signing of the Moscow Treaty some 100 have already been carried out.

Many facts bear witness to the existence in the United States of long-term plans for developing small-sized nuclear weapons, and to the intention of carrying out for this purpose new series of underground nuclear explosions. All this compels us to assume that the artificial obstacles created by the United States in the way to an agreement to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests will exist until the United States side at last gives priority to an agreement prohibiting all tests over its programme for the improvement of nuclear weapons.

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This negative approach of the United States is also shown by the position of the United States delegation in regard to a number of proposals submitted by the non-aligned States in the Eighteen-Nation Committee with the object of finding a compromise way of solving the problem of prohibiting underground test explosions of nuclear weapons. In fact, the United States delegation rejects all such proposals. An example of this is to be found, in particular, in the statement made by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, at our 279th meeting. He repeatedly emphasized that his Government was opposed to a prohibition of underground tests without international inspection.

In this connexion we should like to stress that the question of control is being turned by the United States---and not for the first time---into a brake to impede the achievement of an agreement on disarmament. In putting forward unjustified demands in regard to control, the Western representatives try at the same time to persuade the Committee that the Soviet Union is opposed in general to any form of control over disarmament and that this hinders the achievement of an agreement on disarmament questions.

Permit me to state that there are no grounds whatever for such an interpretation of the position of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has stood for, and continues to stand for, disarmament under strict international control. But, when attempts are made to impose on us control over armaments without the implementation of corresponding measures of disarmament, we have opposed and shall continue to oppose such attempts. We have always stressed, and stress now, that control without disarmament pursues quite definite military and political aims. The Soviet Union does not, of course, intend to contribute to the achievement of those aims. The myth fostered here about the Soviet Union's "intolerance" in regard to control is merely a propaganda device hindering the discussion and solution of the problems which are being considered by the Committee.

The Soviet Union is very consistent in its approach to the problem of control, whereas the United States side changes its position on questions of control to suit its convenience. When the United States works out plans aimed at placing under control the defensive power of the Soviet Union, it gives the broadest interpretation and paramount importance to control even though no measures of disarmament are concerned. When it is a question, for instance, of the transfer of nuclear weapons to West

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Germany, the content of control is narrowed to an incredible extent. In fact, when it comes to the practical implementation of control over the arming of the Federal Republic of Germany, it turns out that there is no such control at all.

Thus, twelve years ago when West Germany joined NATO, Western political leaders assured us that the remilitarization of the Federal Republic of Germany would be carried out within a strictly limited framework and under constant supervision and control on the part of its partners in the North Atlantic bloc. Particular significance was attributed to the statement made by the former Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, when he signed the Paris Agreements in 1954, to the effect that the Federal Republic of Germany bound itself not to produce atomic, chemical or biological weapons on its territory.

What is the position today with regard to all these restrictions and control obligations? In Government documents of the Federal Republic of Germany it is now being persistently stressed that the obligation to renounce atomic weapons was assumed unilaterally by West Germany. By this it appears to be stressed that the Federal Republic of Germany can repudiate this obligation, since it had been assumed unilaterally. In statements made by political leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as in the West German press, it has been noted that the obligation assumed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 does not at all prevent West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons from other States, or from manufacturing them outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is significant that of many other restrictions on the arming of the West German Bundeswehr, laid down by the same Paris Agreements of 1954, not even a trace remains. For instance, West Germany was forbidden to produce or have in its armaments rockets and guided missiles. As early as October 1959 the restriction on the production of ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles was set aside. Now the armaments of the Bundeswehr include powerful missiles capable of serving as a means of delivery of nuclear weapons, such as, for example, the United States missile Mace, with a range exceeding 1,000 km. Under the Paris Agreements West Germany was not allowed to build submarines of more than 350 tons displacement. In 1963 she was allowed to build submarines of up to 1,000 tons displacement. The Navy of the Federal Republic of Germany is also equipped with missiles.

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Intense efforts are being made to impress upon world public opinion the idea that the military preparations of the Federal Republic of Germany are being controlled by NATO, the Western European Union and EURATOM. Let us take a look at what these three types of control amount to.

Since the task of NATO is to achieve the maximum increase in military preparations, the NATO bodies responsible for control see to it that the States concerned carry out these military preparations and conduct the arms race at the rate prescribed by the governing body of the North Atlantic bloc. In other words, control is not at all aimed at limiting national armaments but at ensuring that the prescribed rates of military preparations are carried out within the time-limits laid down by NATO and to the required extent.

In this respect the NATO control bodies are hardly likely to level any criticisms at the Federal Republic of Germany. The ruling circles of West Germany are carrying out militarization more than conscientiously. And, of course, it is not to be expected that NATO will rebuke them if the standards laid down for the Bundeswehr are exceeded. Furthermore, if it wished to do so, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany could easily conceal from NATO the extent to which the militarization standards laid down by the North Atlantic bloc might be exceeded.

The proclaimed task of the Western European Union counterbalances that of NATO in that it aims to prevent the established levels of armaments of its member countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, from being exceeded, and also to exercise control over the ban on the production of certain types of weapon. In order to exercise control there has been established within the framework of the Western European Union a special body the task of which is to study the statistical and budgetary reports submitted by States, and to carry out investigations, visits and sample inspections in factories, stores and the armed forces. However, such investigations cannot be carried out in respect of armed forces and stores placed under NATO command.

Statistical and budgetary documents and information regarding the aforesaid armed forces and stores come from NATO. And since all the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are declared to be under NATO command, the Western European Union is not empowered to visit or inspect them. Nor can it inspect the stores and industrial plants of the Federal Republic of Germany, because an agreement on the procedure of such inspections which was concluded in 1957 has not yet come into force.

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All this means that the Western European Union has not and cannot have at its disposal any information on the armed forces and armaments of the Federal Republic of Germany, other than that which comes to it from NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany; that is, in the final analysis, from a single source --- the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In regard to EURATOM, the member States of that organization, as we know, are entitled not to place under control installations and materials intended for defence needs. Consequently control by EURATOM in no way hinders, nor can it hinder, the creation of a military nuclear potential by any of its members.

Thus there is in fact no control whatever over the militarization of West Germany. It turns out that the Western Powers treat control every time just as they see fit for the achievement of their specific political aims. Very convincing evidence of this is provided by the way in which the question of control is posed in the United States draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152 and Add.1), in regard to which the Soviet delegation has already expressed its negative attitude on several occasions in the Committee.

Thus we see that the question of control is posed by the United States in relation to and for the benefit of its political interests, which have nothing to do with the task of disarmament. It is in vain that the United States tries to impose on the Soviet Union control without disarmament and, moreover, tries to make out that our entirely natural rejection of such control is preventing the achievement of an agreement on disarmament.

Whenever the Western Powers are unable to cling to their favourite thesis regarding control, they simply pass over in silence specific and business-like proposals on disarmament. Let us take as an example a question long ripe for solution: prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The adoption of this proposal is not linked with the working out of any control measures. Having no chance of bringing into play the concept of control in this question, the delegations of the Western Powers evade discussion of it. Yet the discussion of this question was entrusted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations (ENDC/161, p.2).

When in the General Assembly such a situation came about that only a few days could be assigned to the discussion of the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, an overwhelming majority of States recognized that to devote only a few

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meetings to this problem was not enough. It was precisely for this reason that the problem was referred to our Committee. Yet during the whole of the present session the representative of the United States has not mentioned this question in his statements. The United Kingdom delegation also passes over this question in silence, although Lord Chalfont did state here that his Government was prepared to support any measure which might reduce the danger of a nuclear war (ENDC/PV.250, pp.24, 25).

Despite the silence maintained by the delegations of the Western countries on the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, this problem exists. It arose twenty-one years ago when United States aircraft, on the orders of the United States Government, dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There is not, nor can there be, any justification for the policy of refusing negotiations on the prohibition of the use of this lethal weapon.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly declared that it is necessary to reach agreement without delay on the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. The conclusion of such a convention, or at first the assumption by the nuclear Powers of a solemn obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, would be a major contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament and to the lessening of international tension.

The delegations of the socialist countries are in favour of the speediest solution of the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, and this position meets with the understanding and support of the peoples of the world. The representative of Romania, Mr. Dumitrescu, was fully justified when he stressed at the meeting on 5 July that:

"Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would therefore give formal expression to the juridical conscience of the peoples who hold that the use of these weapons would constitute a crime against humanity ...."

(ENDC/PV.270, p.23)

The members of the Committee are also aware of the positive role in raising the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons which was played by the non-aligned States, which put forward this question for consideration by the General Assembly (ENDC/144). In refusing to conduct negotiations on this question, the Western Powers take upon themselves full responsibility before the nations for the non-fulfilment of the recommendations of the General Assembly and for the failure to solve this important question of disarmament.

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We cannot but note that at the present session of the Committee the delegations of the Western countries have been trying to organize a sort of "conspiracy of silence" also in regard to the proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. At a recent meeting the delegation of the Soviet Union had an opportunity to express its views at length on this question and to stress the importance and urgent need for this measure in order to relax international tension and diminish the threat of a nuclear war (ENDC/PV.278, pp.9 et seq.)

It is well known that the demand for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries is widely supported by many States. And the fact that now, at the present session of the Committee, the delegations of the Western Powers have in fact been trying to evade the discussion of this question shows once again quite clearly their desire to avoid the solution of urgent disarmament problems. In this matter they give paramount importance to their political and military considerations and not to the security interests of all nations, the solution of disarmament problems and the lessening of international tension.

The negative position of the Western Powers in regard to the solution of the problem of eliminating foreign military bases on the territory of other countries also testifies to their unwillingness to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations on this question. At the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee we have not heard from the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the other Western Powers what practical steps their Governments intend to take in order to carry out resolution 2105 (XX) of the General Assembly, which requested the colonial Powers to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones.

In considering the present international situation and approaching realistically the problem of disarmament, it is impossible not to recognize the need for a radical solution of the problem of military bases and armed forces located on foreign territory. Precisely for this reason we consider that this important and extremely topical question should be examined with all due attention in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It is our profound conviction that the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of other countries would lead to a healthier international situation and do away with one of the sources of dangerous international conflict and tension.

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The Soviet delegation is also compelled to note that the delegations of the Western Powers have not devoted due attention to consideration of so mature a question as that of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. They have not shown any interest, readiness or desire to consider the question that vast territories, above all the territories most exposed to the threat of nuclear war, should be excluded from the sphere of a possible nuclear conflict.

The Soviet delegation deems it necessary to declare once again that a very valuable contribution in this field would be the formation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe -- an area where the armed forces of the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries are directly opposite each other. Adoption of the proposal of the Government of the People's Republic of Poland (ENDC/C.1/1), which has long been advocating the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, would be an important measure to ensure European security and would undoubtedly contribute to a general easing of international tension.

The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed that the normalization of the situation in Europe and the adoption of effective measures to ensure European security would very substantially improve the international situation, and this would make it easier to seek for ways and means of solving the important problems of disarmament.

The aggressive aspirations of the West German revanchists are encountering ever more determined resistance on the part of the peace-loving forces in European countries. Europe is the continent whose peoples have made the greatest sacrifices and endured the greatest sufferings in two world wars. The main prerequisites for ensuring European security are the inviolability of the existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the two German States, and the prevention of access to nuclear weapons in any form by West Germany.

The programme for ensuring European security which was adopted at the Bucharest Conference opens up a realistic prospect of easing the tension in Europe through the disbanding of military-political alliances, or, as a first step, through the abolition of their military organizations, and also through the elimination of foreign military bases on the European continent and the implementation of other measures to remove the threat of a military conflict in Europe.

At our meeting of 4 August the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, stated in regard to the proposals of the People's Republic of Poland concerning measures to ensure European security that "only an extension to the east of the territories covered

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

by the plan could give the Polish suggestions a concrete character and serious chances of success" (ENDC/PV.279, p.20). That idea expressed by the representative of Italy is not a new one. We have already found it in official documents of the Federal Republic of Germany, including the well-known Note of the West German Government dated 25 March 1966. In that Note the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany proposed that measures for freezing and reducing nuclear weapons should be extended to the whole of Europe, leaving aside the nuclear potential of the United States, and claimed that such a decision would make it possible to "maintain the general balance of forces".

At the conclusion of this stage of the Committee's discussion of the question of collateral measures that would contribute to the solution of the disarmament problem, the Soviet delegation is compelled to note with regret that the representatives of the Western Powers do not show any interest in the consideration of measures which could be carried out in the first place. The declaration of the United States delegation about its alleged desire to achieve agreement on collateral measures is nothing but a verbal cover for the real absolutely opposite position of the United States in this matter.

Speaking on 3 August in the Supreme Council of the USSR in connexion with the Declaration of the Soviet Government on basic questions of domestic and foreign policy, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, stressed that the Soviet Union's struggle for disarmament was an integral part of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Government considers that, even in the present extremely tense international situation, when war is being waged in Viet-Nam -- .

"... even now it would be possible to carry out a number of important collateral measures in this field in order to stop at least a further increase in armaments and the growth of military production.

"One such measure might be the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons on such a basis as would preclude all possibility of their further proliferation. Another such measure might be the prohibition of all nuclear tests." (Izvestia, 4 August 1966, p.4)

In accordance with the principles of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union we shall continue to endeavour to achieve progress in problems of disarmament. We see in this the pledge of progress in solving these questions.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): The Polish delegation wishes to make only a few brief observations on the subject of collateral measures which is on the agenda of our Committee (ENDC/PV.272, p. 36). It seems to me that we all agree that the usefulness of collateral measures must be assessed from the point of view of the role they can play in increasing international confidence and strengthening international peace and security, as well as from the point of view of their contribution to the objective of general and complete disarmament.

Therefore, when examining the different proposals before us we must, I believe, take into consideration their military as well as their political and psychological implications. We should also be conscious of the desires and responsive to the wishes and preferences of the world public. Finally, it seems to me that we should bear in mind the fact that our ability to bring about agreements on substantial disarmament measures is constantly being tested and evaluated against the background of our record of performance in the field of collateral measures.

The proposals for collateral measures which have been submitted to us cover a very wide range of subjects. I do not intend to deal with all of them; I should like to concentrate my attention today on two subjects closely related to the question of non-proliferation, which has been given the highest priority in our discussion: namely, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The Polish delegation agrees with the view expressed in the Committee that the extension of the Moscow test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground tests also is a matter of vital importance. The solution of this problem is long overdue. It could have been settled years ago if it were not for the insistence of the Western Powers on on-site inspection. Many proposals are now before us which constitute an attempt to bridge the gap separating the main nuclear Powers. I think tribute should be paid to the efforts of the non-aligned countries, especially the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259) and Sweden (ENDC/154; PV.247, 256), to bring about a rapprochement of the opposing points of view. We believe that several proposals submitted by them deserve the most careful examination, and we hope that the statements of Lord Chalfont and Mr. Fisher which we heard at the last meeting may be a sign of greater flexibility on the part of their Governments -- a flexibility which is so necessary if we are to arrive at a successful solution of the problem.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Many speakers who have participated in this debate have rightly stressed the vital importance of an agreement to ban nuclear-weapon tests in all environments as a useful complement to our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that that consideration should reinforce our determination to explore possible avenues leading towards an agreement on both issues. Both are ripe for solution. The only thing needed is the political will.

Many speakers have also pointed out that the creation of nuclear-free zones could make a vital contribution towards the solution of the problem of preventing proliferation. Needless to say, that has always been our view. We have been advocating the creation of such zones since 1957, when we first submitted the so-called Rapacki plan, which envisages the removal of all nuclear weapons from the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The submission of the Rapacki plan started a world-wide movement in favour of the denuclearization of many regions -- of northern Europe and the Balkans, of Africa and Latin America. The proposals on the denuclearization of Africa (A/RES/2033(XX); ENDC/162) and Latin America (A/RES/1911(XVIII); ENDC/117) have been endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The agreement on the transformation of Latin America into a nuclear-free zone is, as we have been told, in the final stages of drafting.

I think that this Committee can only welcome with satisfaction that general movement in favour of regional denuclearization. In that connexion, I should like to state that the Polish delegation supports the view of the Mexican delegation that a treaty on non-proliferation might include a clause which would express our support for the creation of nuclear-free zones (ENDC/PV.274, pp. 15 et. seq.).

Representatives of the Western Powers, while endorsing in general terms the idea of regional denuclearization, have on many occasions voiced their reservations with regard to the proposal to denuclearize the area of central Europe. The Polish Government has been particularly attentive to the arguments of the opponents of our plans. We have tried to take those arguments into consideration as long as they could be regarded as demonstrating a genuine and sincere aspiration to arrive with us at a satisfactory solution of our common problems. We have displayed a maximum degree of flexibility and modified our proposals in order to meet our Western partners half-way. In doing so, we have attempted not only to take into account their legitimate preoccupations but also to make allowance for the changing pattern

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of military and political thinking regarding the over-all strategic balance and its implications in Europe. Thus, from the simple denuclearization scheme first submitted in 1957, we moved towards the more elaborate version which, as the Committee knows, was presented to it in March 1962 (ENDC/C.1/1).

That new edition of the Rapacki plan included two new ideas. It attempted to take into consideration the view that denuclearization allegedly favours countries with large conventional military establishments, by proposing the creation of a nuclear-free zone comprising the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the simultaneous reduction of the conventional forces within that zone. It also tried to meet half-way those who were pretending that the removal of nuclear weapons from central Europe at one stroke might upset the existing precarious military balance, by proposing that the denuclearization of the area be achieved by stages: namely, that during the first stage the parties would freeze the existing levels of nuclear armaments within the zone before proceeding to a full denuclearization coupled with a reduction of conventional armaments during the second stage of the implementation of the plan.

We have made it clear that, while our preference is obviously for a full implementation of the Rapacki plan, we are ready to consider proposals which would be limited to the execution of the first stage only. That was the essence of the so-called Gomulka plan, first submitted in 1964 (ENDC/PV.189, p.6), which provides for a freeze of the levels of nuclear armaments in central Europe. We have made it clear that, pending wider agreements on disarmament and broader solutions of outstanding political problems, we consider that a freeze of the existing levels of nuclear armaments in central Europe could be of great value as a contribution to the strengthening of European security. It is also obvious that an agreement on that subject would remove one of the fundamental obstacles which have until now prevented agreement on a general non-proliferation treaty.

In stressing that, we wish to emphasize that all our proposals pursue both regional and more universal objectives. The regional objective of halting the armament race in Europe and strengthening the security of our continent is, of course, subordinated to the broader one of world peace through disarmament. It must be realized, however, that the latter will remain a far-off goal unless we can achieve some real progress in easing tensions in Europe by averting the dangers of an atomic armament race in this area.

(Nr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In this connexion I should like to say to you, Mr. Chairman, how disappointed I was with the last statement you made as representative of Italy when, referring to the Gomulka plan, you based your criticism of that proposal on a series of what I consider to be irrelevant military considerations while ignoring completely the enormous political and psychological importance of its implementation (ENDC/PV.279, p.20).

The more we advance in our discussions, the more clearly it appears that progress towards the solution of the problems of European security means also progress towards agreements on many problems which are on our agenda. That strengthens our conviction that, while pursuing relentlessly our efforts outside this Committee in favour of our proposals, we are at the same time paving the way towards agreement in our Committee.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with interest to the remarks of the Soviet and Polish representatives this morning. I think it is fair to say that I listened to the remarks of the Soviet representative with something more than interest -- with a feeling which I can only describe as sadness at the harshness of tone and inflexibility of substance which I detected in his statement. There are many things he said with which the United States obviously does not agree, and I shall not take the time of this Committee to go through them all.

On one area on which he commented a few remarks by me might be appropriate and, I hope, even helpful at this time. That is the area of our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban. The Soviet representative referred to the programme of underground testing undertaken by the United States, a programme which is permitted by the limited test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). I did not hear any reference to a programme of underground testing which might be undertaken by the Soviet Union -- and I should point out that that is equally permitted by the present limited test-ban Treaty. I do not think it is necessary to pursue this matter further, because I believe the exchange of views which took place at the 271st meeting between my predecessor, Mr. Foster, and the Soviet representative, Mr. Roshchin, made the points of view of both countries on this matter quite clear.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

What I was intrigued by, however, and what I should like to comment on was -- and I shall of course study the record carefully to be sure that I heard it accurately -- his statement to the effect that any inspection is impermissible in connexion with a comprehensive test ban. Moreover -- and I believe my memory does not play me false -- I think he said that on the issue of controls the Soviet Union has had a consistent position, while he spoke somewhat differently about the position of the United States. Yet I think all of us in this room recall that there was a time in the past when the Soviet Union was prepared to accept on-site inspections in order to obtain agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

That statement, together with the statement that the Soviet position has been consistent, leaves me -- speaking for myself and my delegation -- in rather a quandary. What does it mean? We hope that it does not mean what one would logically deduce from it: that somehow there is less interest on the part of the Soviet Union today than there was when the Soviet delegation, speaking on quite high authority, indicated that it was prepared to accept some on-site inspections for the purpose of achieving an agreement banning all nuclear tests.

However, there are some other observations by the Soviet representative with which I agree. Acting in the spirit which I sensed in the Canadian representative's observations this morning -- that we should attempt to emphasize the matters which link us rather than those which separate us -- I should like to refer to his statement about that great day a little over three years ago when we signed in Moscow the limited test-ban Treaty, which had been initialled in Moscow a week and a half before, on 27 July. Our Secretary of State made a statement on that on 6 August, and I should like to read it into the record of this Committee:

"Today, August 6th, marks the beginning of the fourth year of the limited test-ban Treaty signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on August 5th, 1963. Since that time 112 nations have taken formal action to become parties to the treaty.

"The spirit of hope generated by the successful negotiation of this agreement has been justified. The signatories to the Treaty have lived up to its obligations despite increased international tensions, and the world has been spared the dangers of unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. This Treaty stands as irrefutable proof that nations can agree among themselves to enter into arrangements for international control of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

"At the time the limited test-ban Treaty was signed, President Kennedy expressed the hope that it might lead to further measures to arrest and control the dangerous competition for increasingly destructive weapons."

"President Johnson stated in January of this year that 'the limited test-ban Treaty lit a candle of hope in the darkness. The gleam of that candle shows the way to a brighter tomorrow if we will but follow.' Accordingly President Johnson has instructed his administration to walk the extra mile in seeking arms-control agreements for the avoidance of war, and particularly nuclear war."

"The United States Government has been working continuously to overcome the obstacles to a comprehensive test-ban treaty which would ban nuclear weapons testing underground as well."

"The United States has also pressed vigorously for agreement on other arms-control measures, such as a non-proliferation agreement and a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons use, among others, which would forward the spirit of the limited test-ban Treaty. As we enter this fourth year of the limited test-ban Treaty, we renew our pledge to exhaust every effort to accomplish these goals; it is our hope that the Soviet Union will negotiate with us in a spirit of compromise to reach an agreement on these and other proposals."

The Conference decided to issue the following communique

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 280th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Francesco Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, the United States, the USSR and Poland.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 11 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.